By Robyn Federman, Head of Global Commercial Marketing
 

An American space company that specialized in the design, manufacture and launch of small- and medium-class space and rocket systems for military customers needed to synchronize multiple simulators at once.

By Robyn Federman, Head of Global Commercial Marketing
 
A major commercial aerospace manufacturer needed to launch small cube satellites into Low Earth Orbit (LEO) and Medium Earth Orbit (MEO), with small to medium sized payloads that supported Commercial Lunar Payload Services. Their goal was to simulate GNSS signals with their rockets, each of which had two antennas.
By Robyn Federman, Head of Global Commercial Marketing
 
Military aviation programs provide standard pilot training to ensure that they can handle fighters, drone swarms and other advanced threats. But as they run complex flight training scenarios and face off against live and virtual adversaries, what may be overlooked is the value of using GPS/GNSS simulation to duplicate actual cockpit instruments, rather than relying on facsimile instruments.
By Tony DiFlorio, Senior Sales Manager
 
The US military needed a time synchronization solution for critical reconnaissance data as part of an aircraft modernization program. To accurately receive sensor data, receivers on surveillance aircraft must stay on frequency and the recorded data must be time stamped for data center synchronization across the military communications network.
By Robyn Federman, Head of Global Commercial Marketing
 
An Orolia customer required flawlessly synchronized receivers on two different Low Earth Orbits (LEO) with a time difference that could not exceed extremely tight constraints – within +/-100 picoseconds (ps).
By John Fischer, VP, Advanced R&D
 
As is widely understood, GPS signals are weak and vulnerable to interference. Interference can be unintentional, such as side band energy from radio transmissions on the battlefield, or intentional. Intentional interference can be jamming or it can be a fake signal, sometimes called spoofing or sophisticated jamming. Spoofing is potentially the most dangerous type of interference. Connectivity and signal disruption is one issue; acting on misinformation or falsified data could be catastrophic.
By John Fischer, VP, Advanced R&D
 
While the use of GNSS – more commonly known as GPS – is now widespread, the signal itself comes from satellites that are 20,000 kilometers away, making it fairly weak and subject to loss of signal or interference. For military operations, this presents several challenges. In a recent naval exercise, a scenario of GPS denial triggered up to 48 shipboard systems to generate alerts when GPS was lost. This shows how GPS is so pervasive and deeply integrated into many military systems for air, land and sea.
By Lisa Perdue, Product Manager
 

M-Code – it is here. Public Law 111-383, Section 913 requires all military GPS user equipment purchased after FY 2017 to be M-Code capable, unless a waiver is issued the Secretary of Defense.

One reason for the Secretary of Defense to issue this waiver has been the unavailability of M-Code user equipment. With Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE), or M-Code receivers, becoming available to vendors, now is the time to start getting serious about integration and performance testing of MGUE and systems that rely on it.

By Jon Sinden, Product Manager, Mobile Mission Systems
 
Today’s critical infrastructure, including many military systems, rely on GPS for position, navigation and timing (PNT) reference. But what happens when GPS is lost or corrupted? How can alternative PNT signals support critical capability in this situation?
 
By Lisa Perdue, Product Manager
 

STL is a new satellite-based GNSS augmentation system: Originating from the Iridium® constellation of 66 low-earth-orbiting satellites, STL is 1,000 times stronger than GPS/GNSS, reaching deep into buildings and preventing GPS/GNSS jamming without the aid of local infrastructure. STL signals are further protected by cryptographic security features that are much more difficult to misdirect or “spoof.”