All Blogs About Aerospace & Defense

By John Fischer, VP, Advanced R&D
 
As is widely understood, GPS signals are weak and vulnerable to interference. Interference can be unintentional, such as side band energy from radio transmissions on the battlefield, or intentional. Intentional interference can be jamming or it can be a fake signal, sometimes called spoofing or sophisticated jamming. Spoofing is potentially the most dangerous type of interference. Connectivity and signal disruption is one issue; acting on misinformation or falsified data could be catastrophic.
By John Fischer, VP, Advanced R&D
 
While the use of GNSS – more commonly known as GPS – is now widespread, the signal itself comes from satellites that are 20,000 kilometers away, making it fairly weak and subject to loss of signal or interference. For military operations, this presents several challenges. In a recent naval exercise, a scenario of GPS denial triggered up to 48 shipboard systems to generate alerts when GPS was lost. This shows how GPS is so pervasive and deeply integrated into many military systems for air, land and sea.
By Lisa Perdue, Product Manager
 

M-Code – it is here. Public Law 111-383, Section 913 requires all military GPS user equipment purchased after FY 2017 to be M-Code capable, unless a waiver is issued the Secretary of Defense.

One reason for the Secretary of Defense to issue this waiver has been the unavailability of M-Code user equipment. With Military GPS User Equipment (MGUE), or M-Code receivers, becoming available to vendors, now is the time to start getting serious about integration and performance testing of MGUE and systems that rely on it.

By Mike Sutton, Applications Engineer
 
Orolia had the privilege of participating in the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) Technical Experimentation event at the Muscatatuck Urban Training Complex, Indiana in late March. During this event, the Army scouted new technologies that provide positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) in GPS-denied environments.
By Jon Sinden, Product Manager, Mobile Mission Systems
 
Today’s critical infrastructure, including many military systems, rely on GPS for position, navigation and timing (PNT) reference. But what happens when GPS is lost or corrupted? How can alternative PNT signals support critical capability in this situation?
 
By Lisa Perdue, Product Manager
 

STL is a new satellite-based GNSS augmentation system: Originating from the Iridium® constellation of 66 low-earth-orbiting satellites, STL is 1,000 times stronger than GPS/GNSS, reaching deep into buildings and preventing GPS/GNSS jamming without the aid of local infrastructure. STL signals are further protected by cryptographic security features that are much more difficult to misdirect or “spoof.”